The Wharton Financial Institutions Center provides a multi-disciplinary research approach to the problems and opportunities facing the financial services industry in its search for competitive excellence. The Center's research focuses on the issues related to managing risk at the firm level as well as ways to improve productivity and performance.
Introduction
In a review of the literature on cross-border banking, Tschoegl (1987) concluded that retail banking does not generally lend itself to foreign direct investment (FDI). Retail banking is a mature industry and there is no reason to expect foreign banks to have any particular advantage over domestic banks familiar with their local environment.
Historically, only Citibank (now Citigroup) has pursued a global retail strategy, though it has focused on credit card and banking services for an urban professional class without attempting to enter the mass retail market as the Spanish banks are doing.
Since 1995 three Spanish banks-Banco Santander (Santander), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV), and Banco Central Hispano (BCH)-have become the largest foreign banks in Latin America. (In 1999 Santander and BCH merged to form Banco Santander Central Hispano -BSCH). These banks have spent over US$4 billion to acquire large stakes in almost 30 major banks in more than ten different countries (Table 1) accounting for some US$40 billion in assets. Moreover, Table 1 does not include the numerous acquisitions of credit card, consumer and commercial loan, insurance, stock brokerage and pension fund management companies, or earlier acquisitions and pre-existing operations.
What is novel about this expansion is that the Spanish banks are acquiring some of the largest domestic banks in their target countries and entering the general commercial and mass retail market. Furthermore, the stock market seems to have endorsed this strategy.
Of the world's 50 largest banks (in terms of market capitalization), BBV (at 56%) and Santander (47%) ranked 1 st and 3 rd in terms of total stockholder returns between 1993 (The Banker, July 1998 . The recent turmoil in emerging markets reduced the banks' valuations but this reflects judgments about the markets and not necessarily about the banks' activities.
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze this unprecedented phenomenon in the light of existing FDI theory. The focus is on the phenomenon, not the theory, and our research approach is idiographic (i.e., a case study). As Bengtsson et al. (1997) point out, idiographic research seeks to create rich description that emphasizes qualitative and multiaspect concerns, in contrast to the nomothetic approach, which seeks statistical generalizations based on analysis of a few aspects across large samples. Our aim is not to prove, i.e. test, a particular explanation; rather, we intend to describe a unique phenomenon and see the extent to which existing theories help us understand it or require modification (Eisenhardt 1989) . Our research included semi-structured interviews with 33 bankers and bank regulators in Latin America and Spain (see Appendix A), and examination of bank documents, industry reports and banking system statistics.
The sudden foray by the hitherto unknown Spanish banks brings up the standard six questions in any study of foreign direct investment (Caves 1996)-who, where, what, when, how and why? Who is the issue of exactly which banks are responsible for the phenomenon. Where raises the issue of the choice of Latin America as the target region.
What is the question of retail banking-the banks' apparently anomalous choice of the product market to enter. When involves the timing of the banks' expansion. How is the question of the different market entry strategies. Lastly, Why is the issue of the reasons behind the banks' strategies. We deal with each of these six questions in turn.
Who: Santander, BBV and BCH
BSCH and BBV are the survivors in an ongoing process of consolidation in Spain's banking sector. For decades seven big institutions dominated Spanish banking. Given their extensive branch networks and the tight regulatory framework, they grew primarily by acquiring smaller institutions. For much of the postwar period these banks operated as a de facto cartel; the banks met regularly to fix interest rates and lobby the government (Pérez 1997) . By the late 1980s, however, the situation started to change. Competition for market share intensified and the government encouraged mergers as a way to break the cartel and to prepare for European integration. Intermediation margins fell, and, though still solid, the banks worried about their long-term profitability. Besides entering new product markets-stock brokerage, pension funds, and value-added services-several of the big banks began to view international expansion as a way to enhance profitability by exploiting their skills more fully.
In 1995 Santander, BBV and BCH were fairly similar in terms of age, size and focus on retail banking. Yet, they differed in terms of control, managerial style, and strategic posture (Interviews #7, 9, 14, 16 and 17 in Appendix A). A brief profile of each bank reveals these common and divergent features and how they have shaped the banks' international strategies.
Banco Santander, then the largest bank in Spain (see Table 2 
Where: Latin America
Given that the Spanish banks wished to expand internationally in order to overcome competitive saturation in the home market, the issue of where to go was relatively straightforward. Western Europe was already well-served by domestic institutions and the Spanish banks had already established themselves in their nearest neighbor, Portugal. BBV and Santander had acquired local banks and BCH had taken a minority position in BCP-BPA, the largest Portuguese bank. Elsewhere, the markets were already mature and offered no particular foothold. As the Deputy Chairman of BBV once pointed out, the US$3 billion that BBV had invested in all of Latin America to that time would not have bought them one percent of the market in a major European country such as Italy.
Still, the Spanish banks have acquired some small banks, taken small (generally less than 10%) stakes in larger banks, and also established strategic alliances in Europe. BBV is a member of the Trans-European Banking Services Group (est. 1997), which brings together eleven European banks, and Inter-Alpha (est. 1972), which brings together thirteen banks. These alliances represent agreements between the banks to share information and generally not to compete with each other (Marois & Abdessemed 1996) .
Santander has an alliance with Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). Conversely, the commonality of language has made Latin America comfortable for the Spanish and permits easy communication (there is no need to translate memos or manuals) and transfer of managers (Interviews #12 and 19; Caves 1996; Johanson and Vahlne 1977) . Lastly, the Spanish banks already had some familiarity with the region. All had had some offices, branches or small subsidiaries there since the 1970s and early 1980s.
In the late 1980s, Santander Investments re-entered several Latin American countries from which Santander had withdrawn at the start of the debt crisis. This is consistent with Johanson and Vahlne's (1977) model of internationalization as increasing commitment accompanying increasing knowledge.
We can observe the same dynamic among the Portuguese banks (Appendix B). In addition to their investments in Brazil that parallel the Spanish in the rest of Latin America, the Portuguese are also returning to their former colonies, especially in Africa.
What: Retail Banking to the Mass Market
The Spanish banks have bought large stakes in large banks. Automatically, they have chosen to compete in the mass market, rather than in a niche (Interviews #7, 9, 14, 16, 17) . The Spaniards are competing in the lower and middle-income (LMI) markets where they come into competition with the largest domestic banks. The only foreign bank that had previously made foray into Latin America comparable in its geographic scope was The Spanish banks have transferred banking skills that are primarily useful in the mass retail market. Interviews revealed that, after making an acquisition and gaining managerial control, the bank would bring in expertise from the home operation for both the asset and the liability side. Information systems and risk assessment were among the first areas subject to overhaul (Interviews #3, 4, 6, 8, 9, (16) (17) (18) 21) . The introduction of new products to expand the deposit base would then follow. Innovations that the Spaniards brought in from the home country included banking products with differentiated features such as lottery-linked accounts (Interviews #3, 7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 19; Guillén & Tschoegl 1998) or fast-approval mortgages.
When: Since 1995
The issue of timing emerged from our field research as a key variable in the FDI that we observed. The scissors had two blades: Latin America opened its doors to foreign investment-also in Mexico and elsewhere, governments put banks that they owned on the auction block-at the precise time that the Spanish banks were looking for possible foreign acquisitions (Mas 1995; Molano 1997; Interview #12) .
Although the timing and sequence of economic and political opening differ by country, the logical historical reference point is the Latin American debt and banking crises of 1982. Since then, and as Latin America's "lost decade" lingered on, democratically elected presidents came to power across the region. These governmentswith the support of broad coalitions of the middle class and business interests-managed to introduce market-oriented reforms of the financial system including liberalization of foreign entry. As Grosse (1997) The Spanish banks were not the only ones to respond to the developing opportunity.
As Tables 1 and 3 
How: Acquisition of Major Domestic Banks
Entry via acquisition rather than via a greenfield operation follows equally from a decision to make a financial investment or from a decision to enter the mass retail market.
Obviously, if one's intent is a financial investment then acquiring a suitably sized operation or taking a small portion of a large operation makes more sense than establishing a de novo operation that will of necessity be small. Branches are an integral part of the parent; a branch cannot fail unless the parent fails. Subsidiaries and affiliates are separate legal entities, and typically, incorporated in the host country. Because it is a separate entity, a subsidiary may fail even though the parent is solvent. Conversely, a subsidiary may be solvent even though the parent has failed. Under the Basle agreements, host country supervisory authorities are responsible for prudential supervision of subsidiaries and home country authorities for branches of the parent.
for specialized activities such as leasing or commercial credit, or the vehicle for retail banking.
The Spanish banks (including Argentaria) had had some existing operations in Latin America since at least the 1970s. These were generally branches and representative offices in the various national financial centers, though there were a few small retail subsidiaries as well. Had the banks simply wished to continue to serve their existing Spanish corporate customers, this network of branches, perhaps augmented slightly, would have sufficed.
Again, this is the strategy that Argentaria is following and the push into mass-market retail banking does not mean that BSCH or BBV have abandoned their traditional corporate business. As far as retail banking is concerned, Santander at least could have built such an operation on the basis of organic growth. However, it was Santander that set off the rush by buying large, existing local banks, even in places such as Chile where it had a small subsidiary.
Beyond the issue of greenfield vs. acquisition, it is important to explain why the three Spanish banks followed different entry strategies regarding majority vs. minority stakes, joint venture partners, and the degree to which head-office involves itself in the management of the acquired banks. Santander has been most aggressive in seeking majority stakes with full managerial control and brand-image coordination, whereas BBV initially preferred minority stakes, gradually increasing them over time (Interviews #3, 21 and 16). In sharp contrast to either of these two strategies, BCH has opted for joint ventures with local partners without promoting its own brand (Interviews #19 and 21).
Santander was the most assertive in its Latin American expansion primarily because of its strong capital base, prior investment banking experience in the region, and the strong personality and leadership of its chairman-who likes to make expeditious and farreaching decisions. Numerous press reports contrast Santander's "presidencialista" style with BBV's "team style" of management. Our interviewees singled this out as a key difference between the two banks (Interviews #3, 6, 8, 9, 16-18 and 21; Euromoney Sep 1997: 209-216; AméricaEconomía Dec 1997: 58-66 and Jun 4, 1998: 44-47) .
Initially BBV was more cautious than Santander because BBV lacked the exposure to the region that Santander Investment had given Santander. BBV has now inaugurated the "1000 Days Plan." This is its new international strategy and one which explicitly aims at creating shareholder value. The first phase included the acquisition of leading local banks in Latin America. Over the last three or four years, BBV has leveraged its strong capital base and managerial resources to take full control and coordinate its strategy across borders. Currently the bank is in the second phase of the plan: consolidation to cut costs and increase efficiency throughout the BBV system, including Latin America. As a bank run by managers rather than a dominant owner, BBV may also have been more tolerant of partners (Interviews #16 and 18).
Lastly, BCH has been the weakest in terms of having the resources on which to build its international expansion. Of the three, it is the least profitable and has the least managerial depth (Interview #21). The difference in behavior between Santander and BBV on the one hand and BCH on the other is consistent with Kindleberger's (1969) argument for FDI as stemming from "surplus managerial resources." This, in turn, is consistent with resource-based views of the firm.
BCH's decision to enter into joint ventures with local partners also reflected its perception that the risks of entering emerging markets were high. BCH allied itself with the Luksic group, one of the largest family-controlled industrial and service conglomerates in Chile. The investment vehicle was O'Higgins Central Hispano (OHCH), an almost 50-50 joint venture (BCH held a few more shares than did the Luksic group). BCH had acquired banks in the Southern Cone through OHCH rather than directly, and was looking for a partner for northern South America. In Mexico and elsewhere BCH had taken minority stakes and in Puerto Rico it sold its subsidiary to Santander. In the opinion of Ángel Corcóstegui, its CEO, the joint venture arrangement allowed BCH to test the waters, learn, and then consider whether to escalate its commitment or not. Also, this strategy hedged against the possible emergence of xenophobia in the host countries. The enthusiasm for foreign owners as rescuers of the banking system may fade over time, only to be replaced by concern over foreign domination (Interviews #14 and 19) . Since the merger with Santander, BSCH has bought-out the Luksic group's share in OHCH for a reported US$4-600mn.
Why: Asset Seeking and Exploiting, and Oligopolistic Reaction
Williams (1997) provides a recent and comprehensive review of the literature on FDI in banking. His assessment is that the internalization approach, which traces back to Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger (1969) provides an adequate general explanation. That said, most of the extant empirical literature uses aggregate and macroeconomic data to examine what in fact is a microeconomic phenomenon. It also tends to focus on FDI in corporate and wholesale banking (Grubel 1977) , precisely because of the relative rarity of FDI in retail banking.
Three sets of explanations for the Spanish banks' sudden rise to international prominence emerge from our analysis of the evidence. The first two explanations fall under Caves' (1996 Caves' ( , 1998 rubrics of asset-seeking and asset-exploiting behavior. The third is oligopolistic reaction (Hymer 1976; Knickerbocker 1973 ).
Asset-Seeking
The Spanish banks have been seeking to enter markets that permit them faster growth and higher margins than they are able to achieve at home, as virtually each of our interviewees explained. As Table 4 shows, Latin America differs both from the Asian emerging markets and the advanced markets in terms of the development of the banking sector. The ratio of money supply to GDP (a rough guide to the size of the banking sector relative to that of the economy) is lower than elsewhere. Also, expenses in Latin America, and interest margins, even net of expenses, are higher than elsewhere. As we will discuss below, the Spanish banks believe that they can introduce efficiencies. Even without this, the Spanish saw markets that provided the possibility of growth with the development of the banking sector and high margins.
As Ragazzi (1973) He added that their "aggressive though successful" position in Latin America has turned them into "attractive partners" for future mergers or alliances.
Asset-Exploiting
The Spanish banks are not just passive acquirers of assets. If they were, there would be no need to insist on management control. Their public statements and our interviews (Interviews #3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, (16) (17) (18) , clearly signal that the Spanish banks believe that they have something to offer. That is, they believe that they can improve cash flows in their acquisitions. Having just gone through a transition at home from non-competitive to extremely competitive markets (Peréz 1997), they believe that they have relevant skills and experience to bring to the table. The evidence is mixed, but suggests that after some turbulence around deregulation, the Spanish banks overcame their earlier limitations and became efficient (Rodríguez 1989; Grifell-Tatjé & Lovell 1996; Maudos, Pastor & Quesada 1997) .
The starting point for what Caves (1998) Table 4 , the share of banking system assets in government banks averages 30%. Typically, government-owned banks have created price and service standards that have taken little effort to match. Often this has been an unintended consequence of implicit taxes in the form of policy mandates to maintain employment, uneconomic branches in rural areas and preferential services for designated recipients (Grosse 1997) . Generally, the lack of a rivalrous domestic market has left the locally-owned but non-government banks backward. The Spanish banks in Grosse (1997) found that these banks had a strong orientation towards wholesale commercial banking, and little interest in retail banking. Lastly, the very few other foreign-owned retail banks in Latin America prior to the acquisition wave that followed the Spanish banks (again , Table 3) were indistinguishable in their behavior from the domestic banks. Thus to a great degree the Spanish banks' chief competitors have been each other. Citibank and BankBoston's recent acquisitions of local banks or branches suggest that the banks' strategies may be changing.
Second, rapidly growing markets tend to be forgiving ones. If most of the participants are fully occupied with simply managing the problems of average growth, they will have neither the time nor the resources to devote to taking market share away from each other.
The countries in Latin America are underbanked with a low density of bank branches.
Now that these countries are recovering from the "lost decade," the situation is one in which the opportunities for growth may not depend solely on taking market share away from others.
Oligopolistic Reaction
In addition to asset seeking and exploiting, the whole expansion of the Spanish banks represents a case of oligopolistic reaction. In the "oligopolistic reaction" pattern that Knickerbocker (1973) and Flowers (1976) first identified, a firm matches the location choices of a rival in a pattern of move-countermove or action-reaction. The pattern may begin with one firm (e.g., Santander) making the first move and others (e.g., BBV and BCH) following the leader, but as in the case of the Spanish banks, a leapfrogging of leadership occurs so that at some point one can no longer unambiguously describe one firm or the other as the overall leader.
Oligopolistic reaction is a form of rivalrous behavior that stands in contrast to the "mutual forbearance" pattern in which a firm avoids markets in which a rival has already established itself and the rival reciprocates. Yu and Ito (1988) and Ito and Rose (1994) found evidence of oligopolistic reaction among manufacturing firms. Empirical studies of banks offer mixed results. While Choi et al., (1986 Choi et al., ( , 1996 found support for forbearance among large, international banks, Ball and Tschoegl (1982) found evidence consistent with oligopolistic reaction for foreign banks establishing themselves in Tokyo and California. Engwall and Wallenstäl (1988) argued that Swedish banks in their internationalization copied each other. Jacobsen and Tschoegl (1998) argued that the Nordic consortium banks may have exhibited both oligopolistic reaction and some mutual avoidance depending on the characteristics of the places involved. That is, they clustered in major international financial centers such as London and New York, and avoided each other elsewhere. By contrast, the Spanish banks were engaging in oligopolistic matching in Latin America, not mutual forbearance, something that the bankers that we interviewed fully acknowledged (Interviews #4, 5, 10 and 21).
In oligopolistic reaction the reference set starts parochial and in time may become, in Perlmutter's (1969) 
Conclusion
The three strategic behaviors we have observed-asset seeking, asset exploiting and However, more research is needed better to understand and measure the intangible assets that multinational banks bring to bear and better to grasp what leads banks to use different entry strategies.
Appendix A: Interviews
In our interviews we promised confidentiality to our respondents. Therefore, we note below the institutional affiliation of our interviewees as well as the place and date of interview but do not reveal names or titles. We have listed the interviews chronologically. Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes, with an average of about 45 minutes. The 33 interviewees included presidents, CEOs, vice-presidents or director-generals of 21 different banks, bankers' associations and regulatory agencies in Argentina, Chile, México and Spain. Therefore, in some cases more than one interviewee was present at the interview. 
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